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Kun Hu  
Innovations of the European Central 
Bank in the Context of Financial and 
Monetary Integration 
A Chinese Assessment 
On November 4, 2014, the European Banking Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) was officially launched. As the center of this 
mechanism, the European Central Bank (ECB) will work with the national 
competent authorities (NCAs) of the Member states to undertake the 
regulatory functions of the banking sector in the Eurozone to ensure the 
stability of the financial markets.1 Two months later, on January 22, 2015, 
the ECB announced the introduction of the expanded asset purchase 
program. This so-called “European Quantitative Easing” made the ECB 
again the focus of discussion.2 Compared to when it was first established in 
1998, today’s ECB has undergone obvious changes in its decision-making 
mechanisms, policy means and functional competence.3 Given the key role 
played by the ECB in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the 
reasons, specific performance and impact of the related changes are 
definitely worth exploring. These changes have naturally had a close 
association with the integration process in the European monetary and 
financial system since the establishment of the Eurozone.  
 
1  European Central Bank (ECB). Online at : www.ecb.europa.eu/ssm/html/index. 
Last access on 29.11.2014. 
2  ECB, “Press Release”, 22.01.2015. Online at: www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/ 
2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html. Last access on 28.1.2015. 
3  ECB. Online at: www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/1998/html/is980609.en.html. 
Last access on 29.11.2014. 
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I.  Integration process of the European financial and 
monetary system 
Financial and monetary integration in Europe is manifested in both 
horizontal and vertical aspects. That is to say, the EU and the Eurozone 
have established increasingly closer ties during their continuous 
geographical expansion.  
a) Horizontal integration 
On February 7, 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed, establishing the 
EMU in three stages on the basis of the Delors Report; it planned to start 
the third stage on January 1, 19994 – that is the introduction of a common 
currency: the euro. In principle, in line with the four convergence criteria, 
the EU Member States are obliged to join the monetary union.5 These 
criteria include a low rate of inflation, sound public finances,6 a stable 
exchange rate relationship, the convergence of nominal interest rates to 
currencies with a low level of inflation and so on.7 In the first batch, a total 
of 11 countries joined the Eurozone.8 For EU Member States that did not 
 
4  The premise is that the resolution on the launch date of the third stage was not yet 
reached at the end of 1997; see Maastricht Treaty, Article 109j (4). 
5  Respectively, in accordance with the protocol on certain provisions related to 
Denmark and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland – or the 
so-called opt-out clause – both were exempted from the obligation of automatically 
entering the third stage. In addition, although Sweden did not sign an official opt-
out clause, it delinked the introduction of the euro with its domestic referendum, 
which, to some extent, exempted the country from the obligations of entering the 
Eurozone. Given the fact that the year in which Sweden joined the European Union 
(1995) was prior to the year in which the Eurozone was established (1999), the EU 
Commission adopted an attitude of tolerance and restraint; however, to maintain the 
constraints of the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU Commission demanded that Member 
States that had joined the European Union after 1999 must fulfil this obligation. 
Details online at: www.ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/adoption/who_can_join 
 /index-en.html. Last access on 29.11.2014. 
6  Including the two indexes of government deficit and public debt this is why some 
documents give five convergence criteria; see Maastricht Treaty, Article 109j (1).  
7  Treaty on European Union (92/C 191/01), Official Journal of the European 
Communities, 29.7.1992: 20. 
8  Council Decision (3 May 1998) in accordance with Art. 109j (4) of the treaty 
(98/317/EC), Off. Journal of the European Communities, 11.5.1998, L139: 30-35. 
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meet the conditions, 9  the European Commission and the ECB submit 
reports on economic convergence at least every two years (or at the request 
of a Member State with derogation) to the European Council to assess 
whether they are eligible to join the Eurozone. If the Member States with 
derogation have been in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM 
II)10 for two years and meet the above convergence criteria, they should 
introduce the euro.11 With the EU’s eastward expansion, the Eurozone is 
also expanding. Currently, the number of EU Member States has reached 
28. With the official introduction of the euro in Lithuania on January 1, 
2015, a total of 19 EU Member States have joined the monetary union 
taking the euro as their official currency. Another seven EU Member States 
will also fulfil their obligations of joining the Eurozone when conditions 
are satisfied.12  
b)  Vertical integration  
In 1999, in line with the launch of the euro, the European Commission 
issued the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), which was intended to 
promote the full integration of the financial sector and capital markets.13 
The core of this program is the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID), which was designed to promote the cross-border activities of 
investors within the EU.14 The financial systems of EU countries (with the 
exception of the United Kingdom) are bank-oriented; the banks are also 
regarded as key players in the financial system, as they serve the function 
 
9  Member state with derogation.  
10  Sweden adopted a method without applying to join this mechanism; so it has no 
need to respond to the pressure of fulfilling the obligations of joining the Eurozone. 
11  TFEU, Art. 140 (Maastricht Treaty, Art. 109 j). 
12  With the exception of the United Kingdom and Denmark, the remaining seven 
Member States that have not introduced the euro have been seeking to enter the 
European exchange rate mechanism in order to introduce the euro; however, from 1 
Jan. 1999 to now, Denmark has been a Member State of the European exchange rate 
mechanism. For details, see Keynote Speech by Mario Draghi on 25.9.2014. Online 
at: www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2014/html/sp140925_1.en.html. Last access 
on 29.11.2014. 
13  See European Commission (EC). Online at: ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/ 
actionplan/index_en.htm#transposition. Last access on 29.11.2014. 
14  Directive 2004/39/EC, OJ L 145, 30.4.2004: 1-44. 
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of providing liquidity for individuals, enterprises and other financial 
institutions.15 Therefore, the vertical deepening of European financial and 
monetary integration is mainly reflected in the integration of the financial 
system dominated by the banking sector.  
1. Price-based indicators: According to the law of one price, the 
convergence of the price of financial assets or return (i.e. interest rates) 
may reflect the deepening of its integration. Before the outbreak of the 
European debt crisis, the EU wholesale banking business, such as inter-
bank lending, investment banking, government bonds and various financial 
derivatives markets, had reached a high degree of integration. The yields on 
the money market and government bonds (especially in the Eurozone 
countries) almost entirely converged; corporate bond yields were basically 
immune from the environment of their respective nations but were more 
affected by various types of common factors. Although the integration 
process of the retail banking business is relatively slow due to various 
factors,16 there was quite an obvious trend of increasingly smaller interest 
rate differences.17  
2.  Quantity-based indicators: The integration of the financial sector also 
means more frequent cross-border business activities of different types for 
financial institutions. From 2000 to 2007, the cross-border penetration 
index 18  of the EU banking sector increased from 14% to 21%. 19  The 
 
15  Kleimeier, S./Sander H., Integrating Europe’s Retail Banking Market: Where Do 
We Stand? Research Report in Finance and Banking, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Brussels, 2007: 5-6. 
16  The factors restricting the convergence of interest rates in retail banking mainly 
include banking clients’ trust in local banks, information asymmetry, transportation 
costs and barriers to integration. 
17  Commission of the European Communities, European Financial Integration Report 
2007, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2007), 1696, Brussels, 
10.12.2007: 8-9. 
18  This is the proportion of other EU Member States’ banking assets in an EU member 
state’s total banking assets. 
19  Schoenmaker, D., Post-Crisis Reversal in Banking and Insurance Integration. An 
Empirical Survey, European Commission Economic Papers 496, April 2013: 12-14; 
de Haan, J. D./Oosterloo, S./Schoenmaker, D., European Financial Markets and 
Institutions, Cambridge, 2009: 220. 
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weighted average of the cross-border business of the top 30 banks20 in the 
rest of the EU increased from 20% in 2000 to 23% in 2007.21 Meanwhile, 
on the one hand, the introduction of the euro and the implementation of the 
financial integration measures intensified competition among banks, and 
banks (and the financial trading market) sought to enhance competitiveness 
through mergers and acquisitions; on the other hand, conditions for cross-
border mergers and the acquisition of banks (and the financial trading 
market) were created, and as a result cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
in the EU grew exponentially.22  
c)  Summary  
Since the start of the European Monetary Union, following the EU’s 
eastward expansion and the maturation of the conditions of non-Eurozone 
Member States, the Eurozone has continued to expand. At the same time, 
the European financial sector is also increasingly integrated thanks to a 
series of measures: The price of capital and its rate of return between 
EU/Eurozone Member States converged, and cross-border financial 
business in the region was increasingly frequent. The internal relationship 
of the financial system is closer, and the influence between the financial 
institutes continued to be enhanced, thereby showing a higher level of 
integration.23 Such changes in the external environment will naturally have 
a far-reaching influence on the operation of the European Central Bank’s 
relevant mechanisms.  
 
20  In 2007, the total assets of these 30 banks accounted for about 63.61% of the EU’s 
total banking assets. 
21  Schoenmaker, D./Peek, T., “The State of the Banking Sector in Europe”, in: OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, No.1102, ECO/WKP (2013), 94, 2014:17. 
22  Ref. Haan, J. D./Oosterloo, S./Schoenmaker, D., European Financial Markets and 
Institutions, Cambridge, 2009: 227 (for a detailed analysis and data related to the 
deepening vertical integration of internal finance in the European Union/Eurozone).  
23  Council of the European Union, “Proposal for a Council Regulation Conferring 
Specific Tasks on the European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the 
Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions”, 2012/0242(CNS), Brussels, 
14.12.2012. Online at: register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st17/st17812.en12. 
pdf. Last access on 30.11.2014. 
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II.  Changes to the ECB’s decision-making 
mechanisms in the context of integration 
a)  ECB decision-making system 
The ECB’s decision-making mechanism is divided into three levels: the 
Executive Board, the Governing Council and the General Council. The 
Executive Board is responsible for the daily operations of the ECB, 
including the preparatory meeting of the Governing Council, the 
implementation of the Governing Council’s monetary policy guidelines and 
relevant decisions, and the delivery of necessary instructions to other 
central banks; meanwhile, it can exercise the corresponding powers 
authorized by the Governing Council.  
The Executive Board shall consist of a president, a vice president and four 
professionals. To ensure that the institution takes the overall interests of the 
Eurozone as the fundamental starting point, its members must obtain a 
qualified majority from the European Council before they are appointed.24 
Meanwhile, the term of the Executive Board members is defined as eight 
years and is non-renewable, and the first members have staggered outgoing 
times so as to maintain the continuity and stability of the monetary policy.25 
The Governing Council is the highest decision-making body of the ECB, 
and it is responsible for formulating the Eurozone’s monetary policy and 
passing necessary guidelines for the fulfilment of the responsibilities of the 
ECB and the Eurosystem. The Governing Council consists of all members 
of the Executive Board and the governors of all Member States’ central 
banks in the Eurozone. 26  The president of the European Central Bank 
serves as the chairman and voting generally follows the “one member, one 
 
24  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Art. 283 (Maastricht 
Treaty, Art. 109 a). 
25  Since the establishment of the European Central Bank, Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain have had always a seat on the Executive Board; in 2012, Luxembourg’s Yves 
Mersch replaced Spain’s José Manuel González-Páramo as the member of the 
Executive Board, breaking this tradition.  
26  TFEU, Art. 283 explicitly stipulates that the Governing Council is composed of 
members of the ECB Executive Board and Central Bank governors of Eurozone 
Member States. See Nice Treaty, Art. 112 and Maastricht Treaty Art. 109 a.  
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vote” and “simple majority” principles;27 on some specific issues (such as 
subscribed capital, foreign exchange reserves and proceeds from the ECB), 
it follows the principle of the qualified majority, and the members of the 
Executive Board have no right to vote.28 
Given that not all EU countries have joined the Eurozone, the General 
Council was established; it is composed of the European Central Bank’s 
president and vice presidents and the governors of all EU Member States’ 
central banks. Its function is similar to that of the European Monetary 
Institute (EMI), and it is responsible for coordination and cooperation 
between the various central banks and monetary policies in the EU during 
the transition period.29 
b) Impact of the integration process on decision-making 
mechanisms  
As the central bank of the Eurozone, ECB monetary policy shall take the 
overall interest of the Eurozone as its fundamental starting point. Therefore, 
it is necessary to avoid the domination of monetary policy by Member 
States that have advantages in terms of numbers, but have a small volume 
of the economy and population, as this will result in a lack of 
representation in the area of monetary policy. However, the continuous 
expansion of the monetary union in geographical terms leads to a 
corresponding expansion of the Governing Board. Under the “one member, 
one vote” and “simple majority” principles, the issue of how to ensure the 
representativeness of its monetary policy undoubtedly becomes enormously 
challenging.  
At the same time, the bloated size of the Governing Council will also 
greatly reduce the efficiency of decision-making regarding monetary 
policies. These problems have caused concern in the EU from as early on 
as before the 10 countries in Eastern Europe joined the EU. On 4 
 
27  In case of an equal number of votes, the ECB governor’s vote plays a decisive role. 
28  That is, events involved in Art. 28, 29, 30, 32, 33 and 51 in the Protocol on the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank 
(hereinafter referred to as Statute or Statue), see Art. 10.3, Statute. 
29  See ECB. Online at: www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/ decisions/genc/html/index. 
en.html. Last access on 29.11.2014. 
Kun Hu 
8 
 
December, 2000, the Council of the European Union suggested that the 
European Central Bank modify the Governing Council’s voting rules.30 The 
Treaty of Nice, which was signed later, provided both a legal basis for the 
revision of the rules 31  and set the red line: The composition and 
competence of the ECB Governing Council cannot be changed.32  
The core of the reform was to ensure that voting results reflect the 
Eurozone’s economic fundamentals while ensuring an effective and 
efficient decision-making process. Because the Executive Board is 
regarded as the spokesperson of the Eurozone’s overall interests, its voting 
rights in the Governing Council should always be retained, 33  while 
adjustment of the voting rights of the Member State central bank governors 
naturally becomes the focus of the new rules. The ECB’s possible decision 
making mechanisms include the rotation of the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC); the representation of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), or giving Member States’ central bank governors different voting 
weight in accordance with specific criteria; and other mechanisms. 
However, the ECB regards “one member, one vote” as an unshakable core 
constitutional principle of its monetary policy;34 therefore, giving members 
of the Governing Council different voting weights is naturally inconsistent 
with this principle and cannot be considered.  
The rotation system and the representation system have pros and cons, as 
the rotation system cannot take into account the vast differences in volume 
between different economies in the Eurozone, while the representation 
system leads to the loss the independence of monetary policy of some 
Member States (especially small ones). Therefore, taking into account the 
special circumstances of the Eurozone, the ECB drew on the merits of these 
 
30  Opinion of the European Central Bank (ECB) of 5.12.2000, Official Journal of the 
European Communities, C362, 2000: 13. Online at: www.ecb.europa.eu/ 
ecb/legal/pdf/c_36220001216en00130014_d.pdf. Last access on 30.11.2014. 
31  Statute, Art. 10.6. 
32  Treaty of Nice, Art. 5; Belke, A./Kruwinnus, D., “Erweiterung der EU und Reform 
des EZB-Rats”, in: Europäische Zentralbank Wirtschaftsdienst, H. 5, 2003: 325. 
33  Ref. Aksoy, Y./De Grauwe, P./Dewachter, H., “Do Asymmetries Matter for 
European Monetary Policy?”, in: European Economic Review, Vol. 46, 2002: 443-
469. 
34  ECB, op. cit., 14. 
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two existing mechanisms and creatively introduced the rotation system 
called “minimal representation mode”.35 
According to the amended Articles of the Statute adopted by the ECB on 
March 21, 2013, when the number of Eurozone Member States is over 15, 
the new voting mechanism 36  should be introduced into the Governing 
Council. The new mechanism ranks the Member States according to 
specific criteria 37  and divides them into two groups. The central bank 
governors of the top five Member States fall into one group and have four 
voting rights, and the central bank governors of the remaining Member 
States are in the other group and share the remaining 11 voting seats (this is 
similar to the representation mechanism). The voting rights are rotated 
monthly in each group. When the number of Member States reaches 22, 
they should be divided into three groups. The central bank governors of the 
top five Member States still hold four voting rights, and the central bank 
governors of half of the Member States are categorized into the second 
group, which holds eight voting rights. The remaining central bank 
governors have three voting seats. After the introduction of the new voting 
rules, the central bank governors of the Member States receive a total of 15 
voting seats, and the members of the Executive Board still hold six voting 
rights.38 The new voting mechanism not only ensures that the monetary 
policy reflects the overall interests of the Eurozone but also fully 
guarantees different Member States the right to express their pursuit of 
monetary policies. Therefore, it is undoubtedly an enormous institutional 
innovation in the area of international financial cooperation.  
 
 
35  ECB, “Empfehlung gemäß Art. 10.6 der Satzung des Europäischen Systems der 
Zentralbanken und der Europäischen Zentralbank für einen Beschluss des Rates 
über eine Änderung des Art. 10.2 der Satzung des Europäischen Systems der 
Zentralbanken und der Europäischen Zentralbank”, Amtsblatt der Europäischen 
Union, C29, 7.2. 2003: 6-11. 
36  In accordance with Statute 10.6, the ECB Governing Council is entitled to postpone 
the introduction of the voting mechanism.  
37  GDP at market prices accounted for 5/6, while the assets of monetary financial 
institutions accounted for 1/6 of the total on the balance sheet. 
38  Statute, 10.2.  
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On December 8, 2008, the ECB announced the postponement of the start of 
the new voting procedure, according to which, before the number of 
Member States reaches 19, the members will continue to vote in keeping 
with the previous rules. 39  On January 1, 2015, simultaneously with 
Lithuania’s accession to the Eurozone, the new Governing Council 
officially started its new voting rules, resolving the plight of the decision-
making mechanism that resulted from the increase in the number of 
Member States in the Eurozone.  
III.  Changes in the ECB’s monetary policy strategy and 
instruments in the context of integration 
a)  ECB monetary policy strategy and tools 
On October 13, 1998, the ECB Governing Council reached a consensus on 
the ECB’s stability-oriented monetary policy strategy – that is, ensuring 
price stability based on the two pillars of “economic analysis” and 
“monetary analysis”. This is to ensure that the Harmonized Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP) in the Eurozone has an annual average growth 
rate of no more than (but close to) 2% over the medium term. 40  The 
connotation of this strategy was, once again, reiterated and emphasized on 
May 8, 2003 at the Governing Council.41 Interest rates are the cornerstone 
of the ECB’s implementation of its monetary policy strategy and the core 
issue discussed by the Governing Council. For this reason, the ECB mainly 
adopts strategies such as the movement of interest rates, regulation of 
market liquidity and release of monetary policies, in order to realize its 
monetary policy strategy. Its major tools include the following: 
1. Standing facilities: That is, the ECB provides overnight lending 
services to financial institutions in the Eurozone through the central banks 
 
39  ECB, “Decisions of the European Central Bank of 18 December 2008 to Postpone 
the Start of the Rotation System in the Governing Council of the European Central 
Bank”, ECB/2008/29, Official Journal of the European Union, 7.1.2009, L3/4-5. 
40  ECB, “Press Release” on 13.10.1998. Online at: www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/ 
date/1998/html/pr981013_1.en.html.  Last access on 30.11.2014. 
41  Ibid. 
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of the Member States in order to signal the monetary policy direction and 
affect the overnight market interest rates. Specifically, the financial 
institutions that meet the conditions on the one hand can use their qualified 
assets as collateral to obtain overnight liquidity through the marginal 
lending facility, and on the other hand, they can deposit excess positions 
into the ECB every day through the deposit facility. The interest rates set by 
these two facilities of the ECB usually serve as the upper and lower limits 
of the overnight market interest rates. 
2. Open market operations are different from the traditional bonds traded 
in the open market (such as those issued by the Federal Reserve), and the 
ECB’s open market operations are more repurchase agreements, trade-off 
transactions, issuance of debt obligations, currency swaps, retention of time 
deposits and so on. They regulate market liquidity through standard tender, 
quick tender or direct bilateral trade, including main refinancing operations 
(MROs), longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs), fine-tuning 
operations and structural operations. Among them, the most critical tool is 
MROs – that is, the reverse repo operations implemented by the central 
banks of different Member States every week through standard tendering 
procedures – and they have a period of one week (two weeks before March 
2004) in which to provide extensive liquidity to the financial market. The 
facility’s lowest tender rate is between the interest rates of the marginal 
lending facility and the deposit facility and forms the key interest rates of 
the Eurozone together with the latter two. It is a barometer of the 
Eurozone’s monetary policy.  
3. The minimum reserves or required reserves system42 serves to stabilize 
the money market interest rates and create or increase structural liquidity 
shortage to make the liquidity facility better serve the interest rate target.43  
 
 
42  The interests are calculated as per the interest rate of the main refinancing 
operations. 
43  ECB. Online at: www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/html/ index.en.html. Last access on 
2.12.2014; Statute, Chapter IV; also see Ruckriegel, K./Seitz, F., Zwei 
Währungsgebiete – Zwei Geldpolitiken. Ein Vergleich des Eurosystems mit dem 
Federal Reserve System, Frankfurt am Main: Bankakademie Verlag, 2002: 30–36. 
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b)  Impact of the integration process on monetary policy strategy 
and tools 
Along with the continuous deepening of economic integration in the 
Eurozone, monetary policy strategy with interest rates at the core gradually 
loses the ability to ensure that the ECB will fulfil its monetary policy tasks, 
and the failure of the monetary policy transmission mechanism gradually 
emerges. However, turbulence in the Eurozone’s financial market and the 
huge differences in the macroeconomic structures of different Member 
States are the primary factors leading to this problem.  
1. Factors for stable financial markets 
The introduction of the euro is inseparable from strong political will,44 but 
the Eurozone does not meet the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) 
requirements, as from an economic point of view it does not have the 
required conditions for the establishment of a monetary union.45 This is 
because, on the one hand, the macroeconomic conditions and economic 
structures of different countries vary a great deal, and on the other hand, 
after the introduction of a common currency, the Member States lose 
control over exchange rate policy, which is an important tool for adjusting 
competitiveness. An appropriate alternative facility (such as a unified fiscal 
policy, the fully free labor market or flexible wage, price policies, etc.) has 
not been established; therefore, the entire Eurozone faces huge risks of 
macroeconomic imbalances.46 Before the outbreak of the global financial 
crisis in 2008, this risk was mainly represented by serious imbalances of 
intra-regional international payments 47  caused by the differentiation of 
 
44  Grosser, D., Das Wagnis der Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion. Politische 
Zwänge im Konflikt mit ökonomischen Regeln. Geschichte der Deutschen Einheit, 
München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt (DVA), 1998. 
45  See Krugman, P./Obstfeld, M., International Economics: Theory and Policy, 
Cambridge: Addison Wesley Longman, 1997: 631-634. 
46  Eichengreen, B., “Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?”, in: NBER Working 
Papers, No. 3579, January 1991: 1-3. 
47  Prior to the introduction of the euro, Eurozone’s major economies had stable 
balance of payments, and the vast majority of them enjoyed a surplus. After the 
introduction of the euro, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and other countries 
continued to see a surge of surplus in the international balance of payments, while 
France, Italy and Spain began to see a decline in surplus. Before the outbreak of the 
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competitiveness.48 After the financial crisis, the impact on countries was 
very asymmetrical and imbalance intensified, spreading to all areas of 
economic growth, consumption, employment, public finance and financial 
markets, and ultimately evolving into a vicious cycle of banking crisis and 
the sovereign debt crisis.49  
With the credit crunch and liquidity shock, major Member States have been 
facing the risk of economic recession.50 In order to relieve inflationary 
pressure, apart from through conventional interest rate policy,51 the ECB 
adopted various so-called ‘nonstandard’ measures that aimed to improve 
financing conditions and liquidity in the real economy and in private 
consumption.52 These non-standard measures included two rounds of euro-
denominated covered bonds purchase programmes (CBPR) in May 2009 
and November 2011 set at €60 billion and €40 billion, respectively,53 two 
rounds of fixed-rate tender-based longer term refinancing operations 
(LTROs) in December 2011 and February 2012 with a maturity of 36 
months to support bank lending and money market activity,54the Securities 
 
European debt crisis, these three countries’ international balance of payments had 
been in deficit for many years; see Eurostat. 
48  After the introduction of the euro, unit labour cost-based real effective exchange 
rates differentiated a great deal. For instance, in 1998-2006, Germany’s unit labor 
cost decreased by about 30%, compared to Portugal. For the study of the economic 
differentiation of Eurozone countries after the introduction of the euro, please refer 
to De Grauwe, P., “The Challenge of Enlargement of the Eurozone”, in: SUERF 
Annual Lecture 2007: the Austrian National Bank, June 22, 2007: 10. 
49  De Grauwe, P., “The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone”, in: Australian Economic 
Review, Vol. 45, September 2012: 255–268.  
50  See related data on the ECB. Online at: www.ecb.int/press/pr/stats/md/html/index. 
en.html. Last access on 2.12.2014. 
51  The ECB’s interest rate decreased for seven consecutive months from October 2008 
to May 2009. The benchmark interest rate was lowered from 4.25% to 1%. The 
figure declined to 0.75% on 11 July 2012. Refer to ECB data. Online at: 
www.ecb.int/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html. 
52  ECB, Monthly Bulletin, June 2009: 9-10. 
53  ECB, “Press Release” on 30 June, 2010. Online at: www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/ 
2010/html/pr100630.en.html; ECB, “Press Release” on 3 November, 2011. Online 
at: www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111103_1.en.html. Last access on 
2.12.2014. 
54  ECB, “Press Release” on 7 May, 2009. Online at: www.ecb.europa.eu/ 
press/pr/date/2009/html/pr090507_ 2.en.html. Last access on 2.12.2014. 
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Market Programme (SMP) 55  and two LTROs with a maturity of 36 
months.56 The ECB hoped to provide the market with low-interest liquidity 
through these nonstandard monetary policy tools.  
However, the EU/Eurozone’s specific legal framework and its economic 
governance model, make it lack a universally recognized lender of last 
resort (LLR) mechanism. The emergence of these measures changed 
neither this reality nor the outside world’s cognition of it.57 In this case, 
although the key interest rate was very low, market fear still lingered. The 
interbank market was still intense, and the bond market was seriously 
distorted. The difficulty and cost of financing kept increasing, the crisis 
intensified and the liquidity crisis was growing.58 Faced with this reality, in 
addition to the interest rate, 59  the ECB gradually began to focus on a 
smooth monetary policy transmission mechanism. From as early as the 
introduction of the SMP, the ECB said that the starting point of its policy 
was the “severe tensions in certain market segments which are hampering 
the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy and thereby the 
effective conduct of monetary policy oriented towards price stability in the 
medium term”.60 Ultimately, on September 6, 2012, the ECB introduced a 
new non-standard measure: outright monetary transactions (OMTs). Under 
this scheme, if a troubled country meets the conditions to apply for the 
 
55  ECB, “Press Release” on 10 May, 2010. Online at: www.ecb.int/ 
press/pr/date/2010/html/pr100510.en.html, Last access on 3.12.2014. 
56  ECB, “Press Release” on 8 December, 2012. Online at: www.ecb.int/ 
press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111208_1.en.html. Last access on 3.12.2014. 
57  Most of these “non-standard measures” were implemented on a predetermined or 
limited basis; see M. Draghi’s speech at the European Parliament’s Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Committee, 25.4.2012. Online at: www.ecb.int/press/key/date/ 
2012/html/sp120425.en.html. Last access on 3.12.2014. 
58  For related data, such as the yield of 10-year treasury bonds, please refer to the 
ECB’s official website.  
59  From October 2008 to May 2009 the ECB reduced the key interest rate seven times, 
reducing the interest rate of the refinancing operation from 3.75% to 1.00%. Online 
at: www.ecb.int/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html. Last access on 2.12.2014; 
on December 8, 2011, it reduced the deposit reserve ratio from 2% to 1%.  
Online at: www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111208_1.en.html. Last access on 
4.12.2014. 
60  ECB, “Press Release” on 10 May, 2010. Online at: www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/ 
2010 /html/pr100510.en.html. Last access on 3.12.2014. 
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bond purchase on the primary market of the “European Financial Stability 
Facility” (EFSF)/European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the ECB can 
purchase its 1-3Y bonds with an unlimited amount on the secondary 
market. The ECB leadership made it clear that the move was designed to 
correct serious distortions in the public bond market due to unwarranted 
panic in order to maintain the singleness and the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy and to avoid the devastating effects of price stability in 
the Eurozone.61 With the introduction of OMTs, the ECB and the “ESM” 
began to creatively play the role of LLR in the Eurozone.62 As a result, the 
international financial markets’ confidence in the euro improved 
significantly, and the short-term risk of the Eurozone’s collapse due to the 
liquidity crunch faded quickly. 
2. Factors for different macroeconomic conditions  
Member States of the Eurozone have different macroeconomic structures 
and development levels, and their transmission mechanisms of monetary 
policy vary a great deal. How a uniform interest rate policy which takes 
into account such differences is a huge challenge that the ECB faces.63 
With the introduction of OMTs, the risk of monetary policy transmission 
mechanism failures in the Eurozone, due to financial market turmoil 
gradually faded away. However, the problem of monetary policy failure 
resulting from the different monetary policy transmission mechanisms of 
the Member States became increasingly obvious. Since the end of 2012, the 
ECB has kept lowering key interest rates,64 but the structural imbalances 
within the Eurozone have led to the very different effects of loose monetary 
policies on  different countries: On the one hand, the monetary financial 
 
61  ECB Introductory Statement to the Press Conference, 6.9.2012. 
62  For related research, please refer to Hu, K., “The Institutional Innovation of the 
Lender of Last Resort Facility in the Europe”, in: Journal of European Integration, 
Vol. 7, 2014: 2-15. 
63  For example, Gros, D./Hefeker, C., “One Size Must Fit All: National Divergences 
in a Monetary Union”, in: German Economic Review, Vol. 3, 2002: 247-262. 
64  On 11 June, 2014, the interest rate of the deposit mechanism was lowered to -0.1%, 
and on 10 September, it was again lowered to -0.2%, see ECB. Online at: 
www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html. Last access on 
28.1.2015.  
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institutions (MFIs) in key countries65 basically kept a stable stream of loans 
to the private sector, and the inflation rate was maintained at a certain level 
for a longer period; on the other hand, in the crisis countries,66 due to weak 
economic performances and a lack of confidence, low interest rates did not 
result in the flow of capital into the real economy, but resulted in the 
circulation of the liquidity within the banking sector, which then 
exacerbated the economic downturn, and the inflation rate continued to 
decline, eventually dragging down the entire Eurozone.67 Thus, despite the 
low interest rates, the balance of loans to the private sector from the MFIs 
in the Eurozone continued to shrink. The declining inflation rate trend 
continued after a short-term rise in mid-2013, and in December 2014, it fell 
into a technical deflation (-0.2%). Different countries within the Eurozone 
have different monetary policy transmission mechanisms, thereby a 
uniform interest rate policy is unable to ensure that the ECB can fulfil the 
primary objective of monetary policy – maintaining price stability.68 
Faced with this dilemma, on January 22, 2015, the ECB announced the 
introduction of the expanded asset purchase program, deciding to purchase 
60 billion euros’ worth of government and private bonds on the secondary 
market every month to promote the development of the real economy and 
bring the mid-term inflation rate back to a target level close to 2% during 
the period from March 2015 to September 2016, as expected. According to 
the program, the purchase by the ECB accounts for 8% of the total number 
of bonds under the program, and the remaining amount is allocated to the 
central banks of different countries according to the proportion of their 
investments in the ECB’s core capital. With the exception of the bonds 
issued by European institutions, which account for 12% of the total size of 
the program, the central banks of different countries can purchase the 
bonds issued by their respective governments and institutions within the set 
amount, but they have to assume the risks themselves.69 In the framework 
 
65  These include Germany, Finland, Austria, Luxembourg and other countries. 
66  These include Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Italy and other countries. 
67  ECB, “Financial Stability Review”, November 2014: 67, 134. 
68  See Eurostat Database. 
69  ECB, “Press Release” on 22 January, 2015. Online at: www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr 
date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html. Last access on 28.1.2015. 
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of this program, on the one hand, the ECB controls all the technical details 
and coordinates purchase actions to ensure that the singleness of the 
Eurozone’s monetary policy is not compromised,70 and on the other hand, 
the central banks of different countries have been given permission to 
purchase debts independently so as to flexibly respond to the unique 
monetary policy environment of their own countries and, as far as possible, 
eliminate the monetary imbalances resulting from the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. 
Possible moral hazard may, therefore, be avoided as much as possible 
through the principle of assuming risk by oneself. Therefore, this program 
is not as simple as a European-style quantitative easing which aims to 
inject more liquidity and increase market confidence; it is more a bold and 
innovative attempt by the ECB in response to the dilemma of 
differentiation between the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. 
This series of policy practices greatly enriched the ECB’s monetary policy 
instruments and, simultaneously, made the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy a new cornerstone of monetary policy strategy, equally as 
important as interest rates.71 
IV. Changes in the ECB’s functions and authority in the 
context of integration 
a) The ECB’s functions and authority 
After the establishment of the monetary union, the ECB and the central 
banks of all the EU Member States together constituted the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB), to exercise the exclusive competence of 
European monetary policy. The system is led by the ECB decision-making 
bodies (i.e. the Executive Board and the Governing Council), whose 
primary objective is to ensure the stability of prices. Only under the 
 
70  Draghi, see ECB. Online at: www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/ 2015/html/ 
is150122.de.html. Last access on 28.1. 2015. 
71  ECB. Online at: www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/html/index.en.html. Last access on 
4.12.2014. 
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premise of not affecting this objective can they support the EU’s overall 
economic policy.72 This is because not all EU countries are Member States 
of the Eurozone; the ECB and the central banks of the Eurozone Member 
States alone compose the Eurosystem, which is responsible for monetary 
policy matters in the Eurozone. Throughout the ESCB, the ECB is the core 
and has legal status, and its independence and price stability-oriented 
monetary policy are guaranteed by law.73 
b)  Impact of integration on functions and authority 
The reason why the international financial crisis in 2008 first had a huge 
impact on the European financial markets and triggered a banking crisis 
and the sovereign debt crisis, was inextricably linked with the plight of 
European banking supervision in the context of deepening financial 
integration. To reduce resistance to financial integration, the EU follows 
the principle of “home country control combined with minimum standards 
and mutual recognition”74 and basically does not touch the existing bank 
regulatory systems. This strategy not only effectively promoted the 
deepening of European financial integration but also led to distinct features 
of the EU banking supervision system. That is, the Member States conduct 
regulation in their own way, and the models, rules and practices of different 
countries vary a great deal. 75  With the deepening of the financial 
integration process, there is a growing correlation between the EU’s credit 
institutions, and the EU’s banking regulatory system which is gradually 
being seriously challenged by a trilemma – namely; that the stability of the 
financial system, the integration of the financial system and Member State 
 
72  Maastricht Treaty, Art. 4, 105 (1), 106. 
73  Treaty on European Union (TEU), Art. 13, TFEU, Art. 130 and 282, Statute, Art. 7, 
8, 9; also see ECB. Online at: www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/escb/html/mission_  
eurosys.en.html. Last access on 4.12.2014. 
74  Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market: White 
Paper from the Commission to the European Council (Milan, 28-29 June 1985), 
COM (85) 310, Brussels, June 1985: 29-30. 
75  De Haan, J./Oosterloo, S./Schoenmaker, D., European Financial Markets and 
Institutions, Cambridge, 2009: 304.; Schoenmaker, D./Wierts, P., “Financial 
Supervision: Which Model for Europe?”, in: FMG Special Paper 143, London: 
London School of Economics, 2002: 6. 
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responsibility for financial supervision cannot all be achieved. This means 
that in the context of the highly integrated EU banking sector, the EU 
banking supervision system that follows the “home country control” 
principle cannot effectively protect the stability of the European financial 
market.76 The crisis has sounded the alarm for this. Promoting financial 
integration is the EU’s established objective, and a high degree of 
integration has become a reality; therefore, the EU needed to choose 
between retaining the banking regulatory authority of Member States and 
maintaining stability in financial markets. Eventually, in the crisis, the 
EU’s banking regulatory concept and mode took on a fundamental change 
from “home country control” to “prudential supervision”, under which 
Member States handed over banking regulation authority to the EU to 
ensure the stability of the financial system.77 In this context, the EU summit 
in June 2012 proposed the establishment of an SSM to ensure the safety of 
credit institutions and the stability of the financial market.78 According to 
this resolution, in September that year, the EC submitted a proposal to the 
Council of the European Union. It proposed giving the ECB the single 
supervisory authority in accordance with Article 25 of the Statute and 
paragraph 6, Article 127 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU): 
After consulting the European Parliament and the European Central Bank, the 
European Council may pass regulations in a consistent manner and according 
to a special legislative procedure to give the European Central Bank the 
specific task of prudent regulatory policy of credit institutions and other 
financial institutions except insurance.  
After repeated discussions and revisions, this proposal was finally passed 
on October 15, 2013. It marked the introduction of the SSM, which kicked 
off officially on November 4, 2014 after one year of preparation and 
 
76  Schoenmaker, D., “Central Banks and Financial Authorities in Europe: What 
Prospects?”, in: Masciandaro, D. (ed.), The Handbook of Central Banking and 
Financial Authorities in Europe, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005: 398-456. 
77  Hu, K./ Liu, D., “Transformation and Innovation in the EU’s Bank Regulation and 
Supervision System in the European Debt Crisis Context”, in: Global Review, 
Summer 2014: 85-109. 
78  Euro Area Summit Statement on 29 June 2012. Online at: 
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131359.pdf. Last access 
on 4.12.2014. 
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testing.79 The new mechanism is composed of the ECB and the regulatory 
agencies of the countries involved, and it covers all the banks in the 
Eurozone, amounting to about 4,700. It implements prudential supervisory 
authority in accordance with a single rulebook developed by the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) to maintain the stability of the financial system 
in the Eurozone. 80  The ECB is the core of this mechanism. The Joint 
Supervisory Teams (JSTs)81 are responsible for the outright supervision of 
123 “significant”82 credit institutions, whose total assets account for 82% of 
the entire Eurozone’s banking assets. The supervisory mission of the 
remaining 3,500 “less significant” banks is subject to ECB’s regulatory 
standards, which are implemented by the regulatory agencies in the 
different countries; however, the ECB has the final say. 83  This new 
mechanism fully shows the spirit of innovation of Europe based on its 
special political structure: 
For the systemically important large credit institutions that may cause financial 
fluctuation, the new banking supervision system adopts the functional mode 
(that is the European Central Bank taking charge of macro and micro 
prudential supervision and the member countries of business conduct 
supervision) so as to rapidly and effectively maintain financial market stability; 
for small and medium-sized credit institutions, the integration mode is adopted 
(that is the European Central Bank taking charge of macro prudential 
supervision and the member countries of micro prudential supervision and 
business conduct supervision) so as to more flexibly guarantee the safety of 
credit institutions and maintain banks’ customers’ interests. This is no doubt 
huge innovation in the financial supervision mode itself.84 
 
79  ECB, op. cit. Online at: www.ecb.europa.eu/ssm/html/index.en. 
html. Last access on 4.11.2014. 
80  Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013, Official Journal of the 
European Union, L287, 29.10.2013, Article 7. 
81  ECB, “Leitfaden zur Bankenaufsicht”, 11/2014: 12. Online at: 
www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssmguidebankingsupervision2014
11.de.pdf. Last access on 4.12.2014. 
82  See ECB, “The List of Significant Supervised Entities and the List of Less 
Significant Institutions”, September 2014. Online at: www.ecb.europa.eu 
/pub/pdf/other/ssm-listofsupervisedentities1409en.pdf. Last access on 4.12.2014. 
83  The issuance, cancellation and transfer of all banks’ licenses are the direct 
responsibility of the ECB; please also refer to the official website of the SSM. 
Online at: www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/sr141104. 
de.html. Last access on 4.12.2014. 
84  Hu, K./Liu, D., “Transformation and Innovation in the EU’s Bank Regulation and 
Supervision System in the European Debt Crisis Context”, in: Global Review, 
Summer 2014: 107. 
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In addition to certain legal bases, the reasons that the ECB has become the 
core of this mechanism also include its sufficient technical means 85  to 
perform these supervisory functions; through its Banking Supervision 
Committee (BSC), it has accumulated a wealth of experience and expertise 
in banking supervision and maintaining financial market stability, and 
moreover, it is the observer of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS).86 
To avoid conflict between banking regulatory functions and monetary 
policy functions and ensure their independence, the ECB established within 
itself a supervisory board. Consisting of a president, a vice president (ECB 
Executive Board member), four ECB representatives and one 
representative from each participating country’s supervisory body, its 
voting follows a simple majority system. Under circumstances in which 
there is an equal number of votes, the president has the right to decide. 
Meanwhile, the supervisory board’s decision is submitted to the Governing 
Council for approval, and the procedure follows the “non-objection” 
principle; at the same time, the ECB has also established the 
Administrative Board of Review, which consists of five independent 
persons who oversee the exercising of its functions.87 
  
 
85  For example, monetary policy-based information collection and adequate liquidity 
are used for crisis management. 
86  ECB, “The Role of Central Banks in Prudential Supervision”. Online at: 
www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/prudentialsupcbrole_en.pdf. Last access on 25.3.2013. 
87  ECB, “Leitfaden zur Bankenaufsicht”, November 2014: 14.  
Online at: www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ 
ssmguidebankingsupervision201411.de.pdf. Last access on 4.12.2014. 
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V.  Review and Outlook 
In the 15 years since the introduction of the euro, the integration process 
within the European Economic and Monetary Union has seen rapid 
development in terms of both breadth and depth. Exclusively responsible 
for the monetary policy of the Eurozone, the European Central Bank has 
continued to adjust to cope with the challenges brought about by changes 
resulting from various innovations.  
First, the EU and the Eurozone continue to expand, making the original 
decision-making mechanism unable to ensure representative monetary 
policy at the Eurozone level. To this end, on the basis of the traditional 
“rotation system” and “representation system”, and factoring in the local 
features, the ECB creatively introduced the so-called “minimal 
representation model”, which not only ensures the fairness and 
independence of decision-making by all members of the Governing 
Council but also helps monetary policy reflect the needs of the regional 
economy as a whole. 
Second, the Eurozone, as a “non-optimal currency area”, faces huge risks 
of imbalances everywhere, which triggered the banking crisis and the 
sovereign debt crisis under the impact of the international financial crisis. 
The Eurozone’s monetary policy transmission mechanism was distorted by 
the crisis, and the ECB’s interest rate-oriented monetary policy tradition 
frequently failed, prompting the ECB to introduce all sorts of non-standard 
monetary policy tools and eventually treating the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy as the strategic fulcrum of monetary policy, equally as 
important as interest rates. 
Again, under the impact of the international financial crisis, the Eurozone’s 
banking supervision system was seriously challenged by the “trilemma”, 
and the highly integrated European financial market quickly fell into 
turmoil, triggering the banking crisis and the sovereign debt crisis.  
Ultimately, the Eurozone Member States gave up the “home country 
control” principle of banking regulation, handing over the regulatory 
authority of banking to the ECB and introduced the structure-subtle SSM to 
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ensure stability of the financial system. Since then, as the core of the 
ECB/Eurosystem, the ECB, while fulfilling the functions of the exclusive 
monetary policy, its authority has also extended to the field of financial 
regulation. Hence, it has become the core of the SSM. Every change in the 
ECB reflects the European spirit of innovation.  
However, in light of the economic and social imbalances and huge 
differences in macroeconomic conditions within the Eurozone, can 
measures taking into account the different monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms of its Member States work? At the same time, can the 
carefully designed SSM framework really ensure mutual independence of 
monetary policy and banking supervision functions? We must wait and see. 
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